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John Stuart Mill dominates contemporary pornography debates where he is routinely 
invoked as an authoritative defence against regulation. This article, by contrast, 
argues that a broader understanding of Mill’s ethical liberalism, his utilitarianism 
and his feminism casts doubt over such an assumption. New insights into Mill’s 
thinking on sex, sexual activity and on the regulation of prostitution, reveal an 
altogether more nuanced and activist approach. In this light, we argue that John 
Stuart Mill would almost certainly have recommended the regulation of some forms of 
pornography.  
 
 
In discussions over the regulation of pornography, the name of John Stuart Mill is ubiquitous. 
As a figure, he loomed large in twentieth century debates, with his ‘harm principle’ taking 
centre stage in the British Report on Obscenity and Censorship published in 1979.
1
 More than 
three decades on, with pornography again a contentious topic of public debate, his name 
continues to be deployed as an authoritative defence against regulation. However, his 
ubiquity is paradoxical. While Mill was a prolific writer on an extensive range of issues, 
including marriage, spousal abuse, parental neglect and prostitution, he published no work on 
pornography. This absence is all the more curious when we recall the contemporary debate 
surrounding the adoption in 1857 of the Obscene Publications Act. Why was Mill not moved 
to protest against this rather obvious statutory restriction on freedom of speech?  
 
In the absence of any written views, we are left to infer what Mill might have recommended 
in relation to pornography regulation from his other published work and activities. And there 
has been no shortage of inferences, most of which suggest that Mill would have been against 
the regulation of pornography. In this article, we challenge such assumptions, arguing that 
there is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that he would not only have 
countenanced, but may also have recommended, a necessary measure of regulation.
2
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1
Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship (the ‘Williams’ Report’) (Cmnd 7772, 1979). 
2
 While the boundaries between ‘adult’ and ‘child’ pornography are not as marked as is often assumed, for 
pragmatic purposes, the focus of this article is on what is generally labelled as ‘adult’ pornography; namely 
material in which the participants are over eighteen. In relation to definitions of pornography, while always 
contentious, this article follows that offered in the Williams’ Report on the basis that it is well known and 
forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Society (2014) 
 
2 
 
 
To make this argument, the first part of the article examines Mill’s On Liberty and the legacy 
of his famous ‘harm principle’ in the context of current pornography debates. The second part 
situates Mill’s approach to the regulation of sex and sexual activity within his broader moral 
and political philosophy. Moving beyond the specific consideration of ‘key’ texts, this part 
emphasises the role played by his ideas of ‘moral character’ and the ‘higher pleasures’. The 
third section considers the extent to which his ideas and social activism were informed by his 
feminism; a feminism which was far more radical in its meanings and implications than has 
often been suggested. Mill’s radical, liberal feminism sets the scene for section four which 
provides a fresh analysis of his approach to the regulation of prostitution; a surprisingly 
neglected area of his thinking. This analysis provides vital context when considering his 
possible approach to pornography in view of the experiences, discourses and regulatory 
context common to both pornography and prostitution. The final section contemplates the 
extent to which Mill might, accordingly, have supported current demands for the closer 
regulation of pornography. We conclude that Mill would almost certainly have accepted 
certain forms of pornography regulation. In this light, we argue that Mill can provide the 
foundation for new, liberal justifications of some forms of pornography regulation.  
 
1.  Mill, Harm and On Liberty  
 
As we have already noted, the fact that Mill said nothing about pornography or obscenity has 
not stopped libertarians repeatedly recruiting him under the anti-regulation banner. According 
to John Gray, ‘there can be little doubt that Mill would adopt an uncompromising libertarian 
stand on questions of censorship and pornography’.3 The problematic word here is 
‘uncompromising’. Similarly problematic is the assumption that ‘there can be little doubt’. 
The same sentiment is expressed rather more crudely by Robert Skipper. Mill, Skipper 
assumes, would ‘slam the door’ on regulation.4 Such hyperbole caricatures Mill and does him 
little justice. A subtler understanding can be found in David Dyzenhaus’s 1990 essay on Mill 
and pornography. Re-reading The Subjection of Women, Dyzenhaus suggested that Mill 
might have been ‘surprisingly sympathetic’ to ‘censoring pornography’.5 Gerald Dworkin 
also expresses a more cautious tone, finding it ‘surprising’ that Mill’s name should still be so 
regularly invoked in debates regarding the ‘censorship of pornography’, even by those who 
‘feel compelled to confront his views’.6  
The ‘anti-regulatory Mill’ continues to hold sway, perhaps due to the dominant place 
given to his ‘harm condition’ in the Williams Committee’s Report on Obscenity and 
Censorship.
7
 Embracing the ‘harm condition’, the Committee  reported that ‘almost without 
exception the evidence we received, insofar as it touched on these matters of principle, stated 
something like this condition or took it for granted’.8 Specifically, the Report noted that Mill 
and On Liberty had been cited several times before the Committee and that, even when Mill 
himself was not named, ‘[v]irtually everyone … whatever their suggestions, used the 
                                                                                                                                                        
understood: first that the function or intention of the material is sexual arousal and, secondly, that the 
representation is sexually explicit (ibid, para 8.2).  
3
John Gray, Liberalisms – Essays in Political Philosophy (1989) at p. 3. 
4Robert Skipper, ‘Mill and Pornography’ (1993) 103 Ethics 726, at p. 729. 
5David Dyzenhaus, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography’ (1992) 102 Ethics 534, at p. 537. See also 
Richard Vernon, ‘John Stuart Mill and Pornography: Beyond the Harm Principle’ (1996) 106 Ethics 534. 
6Gerald Dworkin, ‘Preface’, in Gerald Dworkin (ed), Mill’s On Liberty – critical essays (1997) at p. ix.  
7The Williams’ Report, op. cit., n. 1. There has also been extensive discussion of Mill’s legacy in the debates 
following the Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Cmnd 
247, 1957). 
8Williams’ Report, op. cit., n. 1, para 5.1. 
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language of “harm” and accepted, so it seemed, the harm condition’.9 However, the 
Committee gave little consideration as to whether or not the ‘harm condition’ was in fact an 
appropriate basis for regulation, and still less whether their minimalist approach to ‘harm’ 
was one with which Mill would have concurred. In the end, the Williams’ Report 
recommended the abolition of the obscenity laws, with prohibitive regulation only being 
permissible where necessary to prevent ‘harm’, the existence of which was to be established 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Restrictions on access to ‘offensive’ materials were also 
recommended. On publication, critics condemned the Report as a ‘pornographer’s charter’.10 
Others, such as Ronald Dworkin, praised its ‘admirably clear recommendations’.11 
One major consequence of the Williams’ Report and the authority it accorded to Mill 
has been the easy elision that is now made between the Report’s limited concept of harm and 
Mill’s own approach. Thus, while it was Mill’s defence of free discussion which was the 
predominant focus of consideration in the Report, it is principally remembered for its 
interpretation and use of the harm principle.
12
 In particular, the emphasis on the requirement 
for substantial, direct evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, has become enshrined as essential 
elements of the ‘harm principle’, routinely utilized in arguments against the regulation of 
pornography.
13
 A paradigmatic example of this can be found in Joel Feinberg’s influential re-
interpretation of Mill’s work, which has itself become the commonly accepted 
conceptualisation of the ‘harm principle’.14 Indeed, it has been argued that the philosophical 
debate regarding criminalization remains ‘dominated by discussion of the harm principle as 
classically formulated by JS Mill’.15 It has become ‘the central criterion of criminalization’16. 
As Lindsay Farmer suggests, most subsequent writings on criminalization ‘have not advanced 
substantially beyond these early insights’.17 Accordingly, critics concerned about ‘unjust 
criminalization’, and, more broadly, limiting the role and scope of the criminal law, 
invariably return to Mill.
18
 In this way, Mill is used to underpin ideas about limiting the role 
and scope of the criminal law.
19
 
                                                 
9
Ibid. 
10
Leading anti-pornography campaigner Mary Whitehouse, quoted in AWB Simpson, Pornography and Politics 
– A Look Back at the Williams Committee (1983) at p. 45.  
11
Note, however, that Dworkin argued that the Report should have justified its proposals on an alternative 
philosophical basis to the one chosen: Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is there a right to pornography?’ (1981) 1 OJLS 177, at 
p. 178. See, further, TRS Allan’s reply that the Report’s approach was, however, close to Dworkin’s own: ‘A 
Right to Pornography?’ (1983) 3 OJLS 376. 
12
Julian Petley notes the Millian legacy of the harm concept and suggests that since the Williams’ Report was 
published, ‘the notion of harm as a basis for censorship has been employed by government and by media 
regulators with increasing frequency’: ‘Setting the Censorship Standard’, Index on Censorship, 28 April 2009, 
at: <http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2009/04/setting-the-censorship-standard/#more-2290>.  
13
See, for example, LW Sumner ‘Criminalizing Expression: hate speech and obscenity’, in John Deigh and 
David Dolinko (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Criminal Law (2011) and Bret Boyce, 
‘Obscenity and Community Standards’ (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 299. 
14
 Feinberg himself coined the phrase ‘harm principle’ in his four volume work The Moral Limits of the 
Criminal Law (1984-88). Feinberg described his work as based on ‘traditional liberalism derived from Mill’s On 
Liberty’: see Harm to Others (vol 1), at p. 15. 
15Duff et al, ‘Introduction: The Boundaries of the Criminal Law’, in RA Duff, Lindsay Farmer, SE Marshall, 
Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (2010) at p. 15. See also Dennis 
Baker who refers to the centrality of Mill’s harm principle: The Right not to be criminalized – demarcating 
criminal law’s authority (2011) at p. 1. 
16
Duff et al., id. (2010) at p. 18. 
17Lindsay Farmer, ‘Criminal Wrongs in Historical Perspective’, in Duff et al., op. cit., n. 15, at p. 214. 
18
For example, Dennis Baker  has argued that the trend towards decriminalization (in relation to personal 
behaviours) ‘is so pronounced that anyone writing within the Millsian tradition would of course feel substantial 
pride in the impetus that Mill provided for judicial conclusions along these lines’: op. cit., n.15, at p. 1. 
19
 id. For a discussion of citations of Mill in US courts, including by Judge Easterbrook in the challenge against 
the Dworkin-MacKinnon pornography Ordinances (American Booksellers v Hudnut 771 F.2d), see John M 
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The problem is that just as Mill said frustratingly little about pornography, he also avoided 
being precise over what he understood as ‘harm’, in On Liberty or anywhere else. Along with 
his wife Harriet Taylor, Mill took great pains over the final drafting of On Liberty.
20
 He did 
so precisely because it was intended to be a polemical essay, widely read and, most likely, 
just as widely criticised. It was never intended to be a substantive philosophical treatise. This 
should not detract from the critical attention paid to On Liberty. But it should serve as a 
caution. Richard Bellamy notes that ‘too frequently’ On Liberty ‘is read outside the context 
of Mill’s other works and the political language and preoccupations of the day’ and that a 
‘more historical interpretative angle reveals a far more ambivalent message’.21 Jeremy 
Waldron agrees. There is much more to Mill than being ‘simply …a theorist of limited 
Government’22 and much more to On Liberty than a banal ‘excoriation of moralism in all its 
forms’.23 This point is reiterated by Richard Reeves, arguing that it is ‘dangerous to draw 
conclusions about Mill’s attitude to the role of the state from any single publication’ and 
‘particularly from On Liberty’.24 He continues that while ‘few doubt its status as a 
masterpiece, as a panegyric for individual liberty’, On Liberty is too often ‘read in isolation’ 
and consequently, and often consciously, ‘misunderstood and misappropriated’.25  
The principle in dispute was set out by Mill in the Introduction to On Liberty. This 
‘very simple principle’ was designed to ‘govern absolutely the dealings of society with the 
individual’ whether the means used are ‘physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the 
moral coercion of public opinion’. The:   
 
‘principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’26  
 
Where compulsion is to be used to deter particular acts, the conduct to be prevented ‘must be 
calculated to produce evil to someone else’. That is, the ‘only part of the conduct of any one, 
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others’. This is Mill’s ‘simple 
principle’ and it is on this ‘slender foundation’, as Reeves puts it, comprising a mere three 
introductory pages of On Liberty, that ‘vast edifices of thought and argument have been 
built’.27 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kang, ‘Taking Safety Seriously: Using Liberalism to Fight Pornography’ (2008) 15 Michigan Journal of 
Gender and Law 1, at pp. 35-36. 
20Mill wrote that many of his works were ‘joint productions’ with Harriet Taylor. As regards On Liberty, Mill 
stated that: ‘[It was] more directly and literally our joint production than anything else which bears my name, for 
there was not a sentence of it that was not several times gone through by us together, turned over in many ways, 
and carefully weeded out of any faults, either in thought or expression, that we detected in it.’ Quoted in Alice 
Rossi, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill – Essays on Sex Equality (1970), at p. 40. 
21
Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society – an historical argument (1992) at p. 22. 
22Jeremy Waldron, ‘Mill as a Critic of Culture and Society’, in David Bromwich and George Kateb (eds), On 
Liberty – John Stuart Mill (2003) at p. 229. 
23
 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Mill on Liberty and on the Contagious Diseases Acts’, in Nadia Urbanati and Alex Zakaras 
(eds) JS Mill’s Political Thought – a bicentennial re-assessment (2007), at p. 25. 
24
 Richard Reeves, John Stuart Mill – Victorian Firebrand (2007) at p. 287. 
25
 id., at p. 263. 
26
On Liberty, in John Robson (ed) Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (1977), vol XVIII, at p. 22. All further 
direct quotations from Mill are taken from the Collected Works (CW).  
27
Reeves, op. cit., n. 24, at p. 265, 268. 
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Notably, Mill provided no definition as to what might constitute ‘harm’. Indeed, he uses a 
wide range of different words and phrases, often interchangeably with ‘harm’, including 
adverse influence on ‘interests’, as well as ‘injury’, ‘injurious’, ‘hurt’ or ‘hurtful’, ‘evil’ or 
‘evils’, ‘mischief’, ‘wrong’ and ‘security’.28 As Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests, this variability 
renders the entire principle one of ‘dubious clarity’.29 Equally, whilst Mill sought to preserve 
for individuals the autonomy to make choices and decisions over their lives, this did not 
preclude the possibility that this autonomy might, under particular conditions, be constrained 
where such intervention, as Bellamy suggests, would be ‘acceptable and imperative’.30 It is 
this point that Dyzenhaus deploys in his argument that Mill might have been ‘surprisingly 
sympathetic’ to censoring pornography, in view of Mill’s overarching aspiration for an 
‘autonomous life of the kind that is achieveable only under conditions of equality’.31  
Bellamy highlights another limitation of Mill’s thinking regarding liberty which is of 
particular note in the context of pornography debates. Mill assigned priority to ‘increasing 
individual liberty’32 but left little guidance on how to decide between different sets of 
conflicting liberties so as to arrive at the ‘greatest possible liberty on balance’.33 Thus, where 
there is a conflict of liberties - for example, between freedom of discussion and equality - 
prioritising liberty itself ‘proves indeterminate’.34 Resolution is only possible where someone, 
somewhere makes a necessarily qualitative judgment regarding ‘certain liberties as being 
more intrinsic to human flourishing and well-being than others’.35 Bellamy suggests that Mill 
simply failed to consider how to determine conflicts between liberties, nor did he adequately 
define ‘harm’, because he assumed that there would only be clashes between the lower 
pleasures.
36
 In this way, so long as ‘individuals and society progressed in the manner Mill 
supposed, his liberalism was relatively straightforward, fitting with the traditional picture of 
him as an anti-paternalist keen to remove restraints on individual freedom’.37 But, when there 
is a conflict, there appears to be little in his ‘simple principle’ to help determine the outcome. 
However, Mill, as an activist and politician, wanted to see his principles put into practice and 
so provided in On Liberty a number of ‘applications’ of his approach.  
In view of the copious literature analysing On Liberty, it is perhaps surprising that so 
little has been written about these ‘applications’; with absolutely no discussion of them in 
contemporary analyses of pornography laws. The reason perhaps is that they are 
inconvenient. Take, for example, Mill’s endorsement of continental laws which proscribed 
marriage unless the couple had sufficient financial resources to provide for a family.
38
 Or 
Mill’s belief in population control as necessary for the alleviation of child poverty, thereby 
justifying legislative restrictions on what, today, is commonly termed the right to marry and 
form a family. ‘Such laws’ he contended ‘are interferences of the State to prevent…an act 
injurious to others’, and as they ‘do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state’, such 
                                                 
28
Reeves, op. cit., n. 24, at pp. 265-266. 
29Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Mill’s Liberty and the Problem of Authority’, in Bromwich and Kateb, op. cit., n. 22, at 
p. 210. 
30
 Bellamy op. cit. n. 21, at p. 26. 
31Dyzenhaus, op. cit., n. 5, at p. 550. Mill’s approach to equality is considered further below. 
32
Bellamy, op. cit., n.21, at p. 2. 
33
id. 
34
id. See also John Gray who writes of the ‘crippling indeterminacies’ of the liberty principle: op. cit., n. 3, at p. 
222. 
35
Bellamy, op. cit., n. 21, at p. 2. 
36
Bellamy, op. cit., n. 21, at p. 24. 
37
id. 
38
On Liberty, CW vol XVIII, at p. 304. 
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interferences are ‘not objectionable as violations of liberty’.39 What is interesting here is that 
the ‘harm’ – the potential poverty of the children of the marriage - is prospective, a matter of 
risk. There is no demonstrable harm; no causal link between marriage and child poverty. Yet 
Mill deploys his harm principle to justify legislative intervention. The mere possibility of 
harm was sufficient to warrant limitation on an individual’s liberty to marry and form a 
family. Transplanting such a proposal into modern day western democracies would of course 
be unthinkable. But Mill ventured further prescriptions for family life. He argued that if either 
from idleness or ‘from any other avoidable cause’, a ‘man fails to perform his legal duties to 
others, as for instance to support his children’, then it is ‘no tyranny to force him to fulfil that 
obligation, by compulsory labour, if no other means available’.40 He further recommended 
financial penalties against those fathers who were unable to demonstrate that their children 
were receiving what was deemed to be an effective education. It was a ‘moral crime’ against 
society to have a child and not to educate her or him to an appropriate standard.
41
  
Another instructive example can be found in Mill’s treatment of alcohol-induced 
criminality. While Mill declared that simply being drunk was not a matter for legislative 
interference, he added: ‘I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once 
been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed 
under a special legal restriction.’ Thereafter, this person would be liable to a penalty for 
simply being drunk; and if the person was convicted again of a crime of violence while 
drunk, then the sentence should increase in severity because of the drunkenness. Mill justified 
this on the basis that ‘making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do 
harm to others, is a crime against others’.42 The very fact of being drunk constitutes the harm 
to others, even in the absence of proof of a crime being committed, due to the risk of further 
crimes of violence. The coercive power of the criminal law was being advocated in order to 
reduce the possible risk of any harm to others, and in circumstances where there is no direct 
causal link between the harm (violent crime) and the individual act of drinking alcohol. This 
precautionary approach was summed up by Mill elsewhere when he stated that: ‘It is the 
business of the law to prevent wrongdoing, and not simply to patch up the consequences of it 
when it has been committed.’43 
 
2. Ethics, Sex and the Higher Pleasures  
 
Mill was not just a philosopher: he was also a politician, an activist, a public intellectual. 
Victorian intellectuals were particularly aware of how their ideas were ‘parasitic upon a 
particular social and political context which rendered them morally and sociologically 
plausible’44, and Mill was no exception. As Reeves observes, Mill was an ‘intensely 
autobiographical thinker’: for him ‘the political and personal were inseparable’.45 
Accordingly, in order to truly contemplate Mill’s approach to matters such as pornography 
regulation, we need to re-contextualise him. We need to place his ‘harm principle’ within its 
broader intellectual and personal context, whilst also contemplating Mill’s other writings and 
activities in regard to what was then referred to as the ‘question’ of women. 
 
                                                 
39
 id., discussed in Bellamy, op. cit., n. 21, at p. 31, and in Gail Tulloch, Mill and Sexual Equality (1989) at p. 
159. 
40
On Liberty, CW vol XVIII, at p. 295. 
41
 On Liberty, CW vol XVIII, at p. 302. 
42
 On Liberty, CW vol XVIII, at p. 295. 
43
 CW  vol III, at p. 908.  
44
Bellamy, op. cit. n. 21, at p. 217. 
45
 Reeves, op. cit. n. 24, at p. 8. 
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First, it is important to recall that Mill was an ‘ethical liberal’46 with a very particular vision 
of what constitutes the ‘good’ life and the steps which society should take to promote such 
ideals. He was a ‘public moralist’, who promoted a ‘moral doctrine’47; a thinker who believed 
that ‘genuine social reform must be premised on the reformation of the moral world’.48 The 
key to this ethical liberalism and moral perfectionism was Mill’s strong sense of ‘character’, 
a variety of ‘conventional Victorian middle-class virtues’ such as ‘self-culture, self-control, 
energy, industry, frugality, thrift, prudence, patience, perseverance, honestly, integrity, 
temperance, sobriety, independence, manliness and duty’.49 This ‘Millian virtue’ of ‘good 
character’50 was a foundational concept and impacted on all areas of life, law and politics, 
fusing together the economic, moral and political.
51
 For Mill, ‘liberty was only vital to self-
realization and social progress when linked to character’ and, without character, Mill 
considered that ‘personal liberty degenerated into mere animal licence’.52 Mill’s pursuit of 
liberty was intrinsically aligned to his idea of the individual as a progressive, morally and 
intellectually improvable, being: ‘only a person of confirmed virtue is completely free’.53 
Liberty was the means to achieve self-improvement; and it was self-improvement that he 
believed people ultimately craved.
54
 
Second, like many of his contemporaries, Mill was troubled by the meaning and role 
of sexual activity in society. Here his attitude was at variance with the views espoused by 
fundamental utilitarians. According to Mill, it was only the pursuit of certain pleasures, those 
that promoted good character, that would bring (the right kind of) happiness. It was this idea 
of utility that caused Mill to reject a pure form of negative liberalism.
55
 Mill wanted to 
improve people and believed that happiness came from the pursuit of self-development and 
the higher pleasures, not the satisfaction of immediate wants; and – crucially - that people 
needed to be encouraged towards this form of personal development. Accordingly, the state 
could never, and should never, be neutral in its promotion of those particular forms of the 
good life which are necessary to promote happiness.
56
  
Applying this tempered idea of the pleasure principle to the matter of sex, Mill 
concluded that a ‘beast’s pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conception of happiness. 
Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made 
conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their 
gratification’.57 The animal appetites, for Mill, constituted a ‘lower’ pleasure, contrasted with 
the ‘higher’ pleasures ‘of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral 
                                                 
46
Bellamy, op. cit., n. 21, at p. 2.  
47
 Stefan Collini, ‘Introduction’, John Robson (ed) Essays on Equality, Law and Education by John Stuart Mill 
(CW vol XXI) at p. viii. 
48Maria Morales, ‘The Corrupting Influence of Power’, in Maria Morales (ed) Mill’s The Subjection of Women – 
Critical Essays (2005) at p. 101. See also John Gray who criticises Millian philosophy as being based on 
‘disputable moral doctrines’: op. cit. n. 3, at p. 230, and more recently still Reeves, op. cit. n. 24, at p. 6-7, 
emphasising that for Mill the promotion of liberty was only ever of value insofar as it promoted the ‘good’.  
49
Bellamy, op. cit., n. 21, at p. 10. 
50
Vernon, op. cit., n. 5, at p. 632. 
51
Bellamy, op. cit., n. 21, at p.10. 
52
id., at p. 22. 
53
A System of Logic, CW vol VIII, 841, discussed in Richard Bellamy, ‘T H Green and the morality of Victorian 
liberalism’, in Richard Bellamy (ed), Victorian Liberalism – nineteenth century political thought and practice 
(1990) at p. 135. 
54Susan Moller Okin, ‘John Stuart Mill’s Feminism – The Subjection of Women and the Improvement of 
Mankind’, in Morales op. cit. n. 48, 32. 
55John Gibbins, ‘J S Mill, liberalism and progress’, in Bellamy, op. cit., n. 53, at p. 106. 
56
Gibbins, id., at p. 107. 
57
Utilitarianism, CW vol X, at pp. 210-211, discussed in Tulloch, op. cit. n. 39, at pp. 142-145. 
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sentiments’.58 Mill also considered that the higher pleasures are preferred by those who have 
experienced both, summing this up with his now infamous phrasing: ‘It is better to be a 
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied.’59  
Mill’s approach, therefore, clearly discounts an individual’s expressed preferences 
and he justified this on the basis that: ‘It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to 
recognise the fact that some kinds of pleasures are more desirable and more valuable than 
others.’60 In essence, Mill connected an increase in human happiness to the development of 
character, particularly the higher pleasures.
61
 He recognised that this was no easy task, 
writing that the ‘[c]apacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, 
easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance’.62 Further, he 
declared that ‘any great improvement in human life is not to be looked for so long as the 
animal instinct of sex occupies the absurdly disproportionate place it does therein’.63 
There was nothing unusual in this approach. Indeed, as Alice Rossi has commented, 
‘in the area of human sexuality’, Mill was ‘very much’ the product of his Victorian era.64 
Susan Mendus reaches the same conclusion.
65
 Similarly, Susan Moller Okin detected in Mill 
an overarching ‘sexual asceticism’.66 It seems entirely probable, therefore, that Mill did not 
wish to liberate sexuality. Indeed, quite the reverse is more likely. Mill once commented: ‘I 
think it is most probable that this particular passion will become with men, as it is already 
with a large number of women, completely under the control of reason’.67 However, in 
encouraging men to ‘control’ their sexuality in this way, Mill’s approach differed in 
important ways to that preferred by many of his contemporaries. As Judith Walkowitz has 
noted, an ‘unthinking acceptance of male sexual licence’ set the ‘tone’ for public debate 
regarding sex and sexual activity during much of the nineteenth century.
68
 But Mill argued 
that men were not biologically predisposed to such a ‘propensity’.69 Male sexuality, he 
argued, was ‘fostered’ by the ‘tendencies of civilisation (which has been a civilisation left 
mainly to the influence of men)’.70 It was these ‘tendencies’ which the state could, and indeed 
should, seek to redress.
71
 
 
3. Mill’s (Radical) Liberal Feminism  
 
Throughout his life, in practice as on paper, Mill proved himself to be an ‘ardent and active’ 
feminist.
72
 In 1850 he commented that women’s equality was ‘of all practical subjects the 
most important’73, and by the 1860s he was closely associated with the campaign for 
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women’s suffrage, initiating the first substantial parliamentary debate on the subject in 1867. 
Two years later, he published The Subjection of Women, a defining text which has shaped 
modern feminist politics. 
It is again noticeable that those who regularly deploy Mill against the idea of 
pornography regulation, prefer not to dwell too long on The Subjection of Women.
74
 Of 
course it might be argued that Mill’s writings on women are of only historical interest; except 
that the injustices they address are in many cases no less pertinent today. Julia Annas’s 
comment remains as true today as it did in the 1970s: ‘It will be a good day when The 
Subjection of Women is outdated, but it is not yet.’75 Strikingly, in The Subjection of Women, 
Mill argued that the ‘existing social relation between the sexes’, namely the ‘legal 
subordination of one sex to the other’, should be replaced by a ‘principle of perfect 
equality’.76 The focus on law is significant. ‘If ever any system of privilege and enforced 
subjection had its yoke tightly riveted on the necks of those who are kept down by it’, Mill 
argued, ‘this has.’77 The law reinforced a socially constructed inequality that was accordingly 
one of the ‘chief hindrances to human improvement’.78 The rationale, therefore, was simple; 
at least in theory. If law was the problem, reform of the law was the solution. 
Most immediately, Mill recommended fundamental reform of the institution of 
marriage, not just in terms of the public nature of the contract, but also in regard to the private 
relations between husband and wife.
79
 For Mill, the institution of marriage was of 
considerable importance in view of ‘women’s entire dependence on the husband’.80 Mill 
observed that marriage was a species of ‘slavery’, deploying a metaphor of particular 
resonance in mid-nineteenth century England. He had already inferred as much in On Liberty, 
which noted that the ‘almost despotic power of husbands over wives need not be enlarged 
upon here, because nothing is more needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that 
wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same 
manner as all other persons’.81   
Accordingly, far from being absolutist in his protection of individual privacy, Mill 
was in fact a dedicated critic of the public-private divide, repeatedly underlining, as Maria 
Morales has pointed out, the ‘incompatibility of domination in the “private” realm with 
equality, justice and democratic rule in the “public”’.82 One of Mill’s major concerns was that 
marriages of ‘inequality’ might exacerbate a tendency towards violence, and that protection 
of the ‘private’ realm led to such harms being hidden from public view and debate. Mill 
repeatedly observed this in his many and various writings on such issues as marital rape, 
domestic violence, prostitution and child abuse, describing the ‘habitual abuse of brute 
                                                 
74
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strength’ against women and children as amongst ‘the worst order of crimes and violence’.83 
He condemned men who were ‘impressed with the belief of their having a right to inflict 
almost any amount of corporal violence upon their wife and their children’ which manifest 
itself in a belief that ‘they have the same right, in their own opinion, over their human as over 
their inanimate property’.84 As a Member of Parliament, moreover, he pressured successive 
governments for statistics on the numbers of women murdered and the sentences handed 
down to the men who killed them compared with those meted out for offences against 
property.
85
 In this context, as Keith Burgess-Jackson has suggested, ‘Mill’s views on the 
social and legal status of women are more closely aligned with those of contemporary radical 
feminists than with those of contemporary liberal feminists’.86 
This is the less familiar Mill: the advocate of ‘perfect equality’, condemning male 
dominance and challenging many forms of violence against women. It is the Mill to whom 
Susan Moller Okin refers when she writes of the richness of Mill’s liberal conception of 
equality.
87
 Okin suggested that Mill had more in common with modern day radical feminists 
than the suffragists of his time, in view of his challenge not just to formal, legal exclusions of 
women, but to the more general social and economic inequality in which women lived.
88
 This 
feminism does not, of course, preclude critical concern. In relation to his arguments on 
marriage and sexual relations, Susan Mendus comments that Mill’s ‘profoundly moral’ view 
is ‘deeply depressing and distorted’.89 There is also a question of naivety: the assumption that 
access to the suffrage, to property, to education and to public occupations would itself secure 
greater equality.
90
  
Nonetheless, Mill was irrefutably a determined activist for feminist causes and had a 
profound impact on the emergence of women’s rights. Mill pierced the public veil drawn 
around the family, dramatically challenging contemporary values and assumptions about 
male sexuality and dominance. In the face of ridicule and contempt, he publicly raised 
questions about what we now call domestic violence, child abuse and marital rape. He saw 
sexual equality as fundamental to utilitarianism; it was the means by which to ensure the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number. He championed women’s suffrage, seeing it as 
key to delivering the political pressure necessary to challenge the social evils all too evident 
in Victorian society. It was this radical, liberal feminist Mill who wrote On Liberty; and it 
was this Mill who turned his attention to an issue which, perhaps more than any other, 
agitated Victorian sexual sensibilities.  
 
4. Mill and the ‘Evil’ of Prostitution 
 
While producing no written work on pornography, Mill did engage in the contentious debates 
on prostitution and its regulation.
 91
 An analysis of his contributions to these discussions 
sheds important light on his possible approach to the regulation of pornography, as both 
phenomena raise significant questions about the interplay between law, morality, sexuality 
and commerce. Once again, however, analysis of Mill’s thinking on this subject matter is 
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notably rare. Jeremy Waldron points out that ‘none of the copious literature on Mill’s essay 
On Liberty so much as mentions the relation between that essay and [Mill’s] evidence against 
the Contagious Diseases Acts’.92 Again, on closer inspection, it becomes apparent why this 
might be so. Mill’s writings on prostitution do not fit comfortably with those dominant 
critical voices which prefer a libertarian Mill.  
 Like most of his contemporaries, Mill viewed prostitution as a great ‘social evil’, 
stating that:  
 
‘with the exception of sheer brutal violence, there is no greater evil that this 
propensity [male sexuality] can produce than prostitution. Of all the modes of sexual 
indulgence … I regard prostitution as the very worst; not only on account of the 
wretched women whose sole existence it sacrifices, but because no other is anything 
like so corrupting to the men’.93  
 
Debate focussed on the controversial Contagious Diseases Acts which permitted the medical 
inspection of women suspected of being prostitutes and, if they were found to be suffering 
from venereal disease, their detention for up to nine months.
94
 Dismissing the justification of 
prostitution as a necessary ‘safety-valve’ for men, Mill condemned the Acts for what he 
perceived to be the state sanctioning of prostitution.
95
 He continued: ‘I do not think that 
prostitution should be classed and recognized as such by the State.’96 The Acts gave ‘some 
degree of encouragement’97 to prostitution which Mill considered to be ‘completely wrong in 
principle and mistaken as to the practical benefits which seem to arise from such a plan’.98 
Rather than controlling the activities of prostitutes, Mill recommended the closer 
regulation of those who paid for their services. If disease prevention was the actual aim of the 
legislation, Mill argued, then the target should be men: for a ‘woman cannot communicate the 
disease but to a person who seeks it, and who knowingly places himself in the way of it’.99 If 
the police were to engage in ‘espionage’ to identify prostitutes, as the Acts provided, then the 
‘same degree of espionage’ should ‘detect the men who go with’ prostitutes and the men can 
‘be obliged to give an account why they are there’.100 He further recommended ‘very severe 
damages in case a man is proved to have communicated this disease to a modest woman’.101 
Unsurprisingly, contemporaries met Mill’s focus on the actions of men with little short of 
incredulity.
102
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Mill was more equivocal where the individual liberty of pimps and brothel-keepers came into 
question. He first canvassed such issues in On Liberty, querying that whilst ‘fornication, for 
example, must be tolerated... should a person be free to be a pimp?’ The general principle, he 
admitted, was that: ‘Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do’.103 
Thus, if fornication was lawful, so must be its promotion or instigation. However, this general 
principle may be doubted when the instigator ‘derives a personal benefit from his advice; 
when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote what society 
and the state consider to be an evil’.104 In such situations, there are a ‘class of persons with an 
interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal and whose mode of living is 
grounded on the counteraction of it’.105 
Such a situation, he averred, lay on the ‘exact boundary line between two principles, 
and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are arguments on 
both sides’.106 On the side of ‘toleration’, merely following an occupation ‘cannot make that 
criminal which would otherwise be admissible’ and ‘society has no business, as society, to 
decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual’.107 On the other hand, 
although the state is not warranted in authoritatively deciding that a specific conduct affecting 
only the interests of the individual is good or bad, it is nonetheless ‘fully justified in 
assuming, as they regard it as bad, that it being so or not is at least a disputable question’.108 
In such circumstances, the state ‘cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the 
influence of solicitations which are not disinterested’.109 There can ‘surely … be nothing lost, 
no sacrifice of good’ by ensuring that individuals ‘either wisely or foolishly’ act on their own 
prompting, as ‘free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for 
interested purposes of their own’.110 In such arguments, Mill held that there is ‘considerable 
force’; but he declined to decide whether they were sufficient to justify the ‘moral anomaly of 
punishing the accessory’, of ‘fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator’.111 
Once again, in regard to the regulation of brothels, Mill admitted that it was an 
‘extremely difficult question’, one upon which he would prefer not to give an opinion 
‘because so many pros and cons have occurred to me when I have thought about it that I have 
found it very difficult to make up my mind’.112 Nevertheless, he inferred the need for an 
appropriate measure of statutory regulation, posing the question as one of whether brothels 
‘should be systematically put down, or let alone to a certain degree’. This ambivalence 
resulted from the ‘very wide reaching considerations as to the degree to which the law should 
interfere in questions of simple morality and also how far it should attack one portion of the 
persons who conspire to do a particular act while it tolerates others’.113 
In the case of prostitution, therefore, an area of commercial sexual activity closely 
aligned to that of pornography, Mill neither provides a resolute defence of individual liberty, 
nor resounding arguments in favour of specific forms of regulation. Most importantly 
perhaps, he was evidently uncertain as to whether mere individual choice, whether to sell or 
buy sex, should always be the determining factor. Indeed, his analysis of prostitution, its 
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harms and causes, bears similarity to the standpoints of today’s radical feminists: 
conceptualising prostitution as harmful to women and society and seeking its eradication by 
focussing on the male demand for prostitution.
114
 Nonetheless, it must be admitted that while 
he may have shared the sentiments of radical feminists, Mill would likely have departed from 
their proscriptions for law reform.
115
 This is simply because Mill envisaged that a 
consequence of ‘perfect equality’ within marriage would be the eradication of prostitution. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that Mill was most troubled by exploitation and solicitation for 
profit in respect of which he countenanced regulation. Above all, Mill was certainly ready to 
recommend legislative intervention in pursuit of the public ‘weal’.  
 
5. Mill and the Possibilities of Pornography Regulation  
 
This Mill, one who nurtured an ‘activist vision for the state’116, is rarely seen in contemporary 
discussions of pornography regulation. Take, for example, the contentious debates over 2008 
legislation which criminalized, for the first time, the possession of ‘extreme pornography’ in 
England and Wales.
117
 During Government consultations on the proposed legislation, Mill 
was commonly invoked by those opposed to pornography regulation, and more particularly 
its criminalization.
118
 Moreover, as the Williams’ Committee found, Mill is also frequently 
deployed by those more supportive of regulation, who appear tacitly to accept that, for good 
or bad, it is impossible to debate pornography without first paying due deference to the ‘harm 
principle’.119 Current debate, focussing on prosecutorial policy and possible reform, 
commonly deploys Mill in similar fashion.
120
 He may not have expressed a view himself on 
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pornography, but in the continuing debate regarding the validity of pornography regulation, 
few people’s opinions seem to matter more than Mill’s.  
Yet the curiosity remains that Mill declined to comment on, still less condemn, the 
1867 Obscene Publications Act. Gertrude Himmelfarb ventures a reason why: Mill ‘had no 
great liking for the more serious forms of social or sexual deviancy’.121 He did not approve of 
‘libertinism or sensualism’ and, while greater sexual liberties and tolerance may have been 
implied by his ‘harm principle’, ‘it is hard to believe... that it was for the sake of these 
liberties that he felt his doctrine to be urgently required’.122 Referring specifically to Mill’s 
views on prostitution, Himmelfarb suggests that it may even be ‘in spite of such sexual 
liberties, rather than because of them, that he advanced his doctrine’.123 From a philosophical 
point of view, as we have already noted, Mill only ever imagined the freedom to pursue 
‘one’s own good in one’s way’ as applying to the pursuit of higher pleasures; and sexual 
freedom was not included amongst these.
124
 Likewise, when he advised the merit of 
‘experiments in living’, Mill again imagined himself to be recommending the development of 
moral virtue and good character; not prescribing a charter for sexual libertinism.
125
 Indeed, 
Mill lamented the ‘perversion of the imagination and feelings’ which resulted from 
‘dwelling’ on sex. He shared the dismay of many contemporaries who imagined the 
development of their society to be hindered by an ‘absurdly disproportionate’ focus on the 
‘animal instinct of sex’.126  
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that Mill would have looked 
unfavourably on the emergent pornographic industry. Mill recognised that his valued pursuit 
of the higher pleasures was a ‘tender plant’, easily killed, and he might well have placed 
some blame for this on the increasing availability of pornographic materials. It is difficult to 
conceive that Mill would have seen pornography as contributing positively towards the 
development of society, or indeed as a necessary safety-valve to relieve male sexuality. He is 
more likely to have seen it as an unwarranted diversion from the higher pleasures and the 
development of good character. The predominant use and promotion of pornography by men 
may well have supported Mill’s contention that sexuality is socially constructed by the 
dominant class. It may also have confirmed his view that men were able to pursue their 
sexual pleasures because of the dominant position they held in society. Finally, the fact that 
Mill drew close parallels between the dominance of men in society, and the prevalence and 
acceptance of prostitution, may have offered obvious parallels for a critique of pornography.  
In this light, it likewise seems reasonable to suppose that Mill would have been as 
critical of pornography as he was of prostitution. The simple deployment of Mill, the 
quintessential ‘liberal feminist’127, into pornography debates can accordingly lead to the 
problematic assumption that his thinking is aligned to that of contemporary liberal feminists 
who either positively promote pornography or at least condemn its regulation.
128
 In reality, it 
is highly unlikely that he would have shared such perspectives. As we have seen regarding 
prostitution, Mill’s sentiments are far more closely aligned with what is today characterised 
as radical feminism. His criticism of men for feeding the demand for prostitution, his 
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promotion of abolition and his perception of women engaged in prostitution as exploited, all 
parallel radical feminist rather than liberal feminist perspectives on prostitution. For this 
reason, it is quite possible that he would be sympathetic to a more radical, feminist analysis 
of pornography which focuses its critical attention on the broad, societal consequences that 
flow from the glorification of sexual violence.
129
  
Equally, the argument that pornography might harm the autonomy interests of women 
may well have attracted his support. Dyzenhaus argues that the harm which might be inflicted 
on the liberty of some to enjoy pornography may be countered by the harm that this 
enjoyment inflicts on others whose interests are thereby diminished. Taking Mill’s principle 
to be normative in that it concerns harms to autonomy interests, Dyzenhaus argues that 
‘governments must not coerce individuals unless their conduct is harmful in the broad sense 
that it includes prejudice to fundamental interests’. He concludes that ‘all the arguments’ 
written into On Liberty are, therefore, ‘directed towards supporting the conclusion that among 
the fundamental interests of “man as a progressive being” is the interest in autonomy’.130 This 
is a ‘rich conception of harm’ and one which moves to ‘centre stage’ the supporting 
principles of ‘substantive equality and individual autonomy’.131  
Accordingly, if pornography can be said to harm autonomy interests, then regulation 
is justified ‘when the limitation is in the service of, and controlled by, the value of 
autonomy’.132 Such a reading of Mill can indeed ‘justify considerable intervention and 
provision on the part of the state or well-placed individuals in order to give people the 
capacity for autonomy’.133 Accordingly, if as Mill maintained, legislation intended to address 
alcohol abuse, spousal violence and the solicitation and pimping of prostitutes might be 
justified, there is no intrinsic reason why similar legislation intended to regulate pornography 
should not be as well. At this juncture, it is perhaps pertinent to recall that Mill’s ‘harm 
principle’ was never intended to preclude regulation. He plainly stated that ‘liberty is often 
granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted’.134 
But what form might such regulation take? As in the case of prostitution, he is likely 
to have shared more radical feminist sentiments about pornography, in particular it being 
contrary to the public interest. A focus on curbing exploitation and, particularly, on the 
creation and distribution of pornographic materials for profit would have been likely. His 
condemnation of male violence towards women is also likely to have provided a particular 
focus on specific forms of material, such as violent pornography. In considering regulation, it 
is also important to recall the lessons which can be drawn from the ‘applications’ of Mill’s 
‘harm principle’, particularly his willingness to recommend the regulation of behaviour and 
activity which raise ‘only’ the risk of future harm. This suggests that far from the current 
prerequisite that there should be direct, physical evidence connecting pornography and sexual 
violence before any legislative intervention, Mill would have been amenable to the 
contention that preventative action should be taken now, so as to counter the risk of 
considerable future harm to society and to individuals.
135
 Further, any precautionary action 
can be justified as being necessary to promote and protect the public interest, with the aim of 
preventing and deterring harm.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
In 1870, Mill advised an audience of campaigners for women’s suffrage that the ‘favourite 
sins’ of government ‘are indolence and indifference’. The responsibility of government is to 
address ‘the great moral evils of society’; to aspire to ‘raising the standards of morality’ 
prevalent across society. Engaging the concerns of those who feared a ‘general increase in 
meddling’, he argued that ‘there is wise as well as unwise meddling; well-directed as well as 
ill-directed benevolence; and there is a tendency in the present day to confound the two’.136  
In this light, the question of whether Mill would have recommended the regulation of 
pornography is perhaps not the correct question to ask. It would have been remarkable if he 
had suggested anything other. The more pertinent question is where he might have drawn the 
line. The new analysis presented in this article, drawing together Mill’s ethical liberalism, his 
feminism and his views on sexual activity, does not reveal someone who advanced an 
abstract ‘harm principle’ which might be used to defend an absolute and untrammelled right 
to publish and peruse pornographic material. It may well be that current norms of sexual 
freedom promote neutrality; but, categorically, this was not Mill’s approach. For Mill, the 
‘administration of criminal justice is one of the chief instruments of moral education of the 
people’.137 As Mill confirmed: 
 
‘It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish 
indifference which pretends that human beings have no business with each other’s 
conduct in life and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-
being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of diminution, there is 
a need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others.’138 
 
Any reading of Mill which chooses to ignore such sentiments fails to do justice to the 
complexity of his thinking. Moreover, to admit a more multifaceted Mill is not to deny his 
liberalism. A liberalism which is more open to the complexity of human responses to 
pornography can be both pragmatic and progressive in offering a way forward when 
considering regulation. Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere, a liberal humanist approach 
founded on ideals of equality, humanism and pragmatism can provide a suitable foundation in 
cases such as this where the competing demands of liberty and wider social interest appear to 
collide.
139
 Building on the ideas of Martha Nussbaum and liberal pragmatist Richard Rorty, 
this liberalism is driven primarily by a desire to craft a political morality that is both ethical in 
its conception and pragmatic in its application. Rorty urged a focus on real instances of 
injustice and suffering: justice as a ‘practical goal’, rather than based on ‘abstract rights’.140 
This is why a liberal humanist approach, drawing on pragmatism, recognises, as a matter of 
practice, the need for a line to be drawn, whilst also appreciating that it is not one that should 
be traced in accordance with any ‘comprehensive’ theories.  
For Nussbaum, ethics lie at the heart of her intellectual enterprise. In considering 
‘objectification’, she argues that the instrumental ‘treatment of human beings as tools of the 
purposes of another, is always morally problematic; if it does not take place in a larger 
context of regard for humanity, it is a central form of the morally objectionable’.141 Context, 
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therefore, is vital and may indeed differentiate various forms of objectification. The context, 
nonetheless, is that much pornography depicts ‘sexuality in a way designed to reinforce 
misogynistic stereotypes, portraying women as base and deserving of abuse, as wanting and 
asking for abuse’.142 Such pornography ‘threaten[s] core elements of a liberal society, 
elements on which citizens who otherwise differ in religion or comprehensive vision of life 
can agree’. In essence, much pornography, with its focus on ‘subordination, humiliation, and 
associated harms’, ‘directly conflicts with the ideas of equal worth and equal protection that 
are basic to a liberal social order’.143 
We suggest, therefore, that there is a strong, liberal basis for pornography regulation 
which, as well as drawing on the liberal humanism of Nussbaum and Rorty, can be founded 
on the thinking of John Stuart Mill. Far from him being the authoritative voice against 
regulation, we put Mill forward as the basis for developing liberal justifications for some 
forms of pornography regulation. We endorse, therefore, Rae Langton’s call for a renewed 
alliance between feminists and liberals in combating the proliferation of pornography, 
especially in its more violent and extreme forms.
144
 As John Kang has observed, liberalism 
‘need not be pornography’s indifferent observer or spineless sycophant: liberalism can be 
used to fight pornography’.145  
Ultimately, however, there is no trump card in debates over pornography regulation, 
Millian or otherwise. The debate remains one of competing values; about who has the power 
to define what is harmful, what is valued expression and what should be the role of the state. 
But even if not a trump card, for or against regulation, we can still learn from Mill. We can, 
for a start, learn not to be dogmatic. Mill was never dogmatic in his thinking; he embraced 
complexity and compromise. Among his reasons for supporting freedom of discussion was 
his view that ‘conflicting doctrines, instead of one being true and the other false, share the 
truth between them’.146 He warned that ‘the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is 
rarely or never the whole truth’.147 Nowhere is this advice more prescient than in the context 
of contemporary debates regarding the scope and limits of pornography regulation. The case 
for turning to Mill in order to resolve some of the sharper divisions which characterise this 
debate remains as compelling as ever. But it is to the subtle, accommodating and pragmatic 
Mill to whom we should turn, not the Mill whose caricature is commonly discerned in so 
much libertarian thought. 
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